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Abstract
Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve has been
engaging in quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is a form of open market operation in
which the Federal Reserve buys long-term U.S. government and other securities, versus
traditional open market operations that occur through the short-term Treasury bill market.
At the same time, the shadow bank system, which is a system of financial intermediaries
that perform unregulated credit intermediation outside of traditional banks, has contracted
significantly. Some argue that this contraction is due to a collateral crunch induced by
quantitative easing in the shadow bank system—a crunch that occurred when the Federal
Reserve’s quantitative easing program took high-quality collateral off the market. I will
focus specifically on repurchase agreements, an instrument within the shadow banking
that uses the same types of securities that the Federal Reserve has been buying during
quantitative easing as collateral, to determine whether quantitative easing has led to a
contraction of the repurchase agreement market. I find that increases in Federal Reserve
asset holdings from 2005-2013, and specifically during QE1, are associated with
decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that under certain
circumstances, Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to contractions in the shadow bank
system. This paper aims to increase understanding of how monetary policy affects
shadow banking and understanding of the unintended consequences of monetary policy,
such as decreased shadow bank lending caused by quantitative easing.
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Introduction
In an attempt to spur economic growth through credit creation, the Federal
Reserve has been engaging in quantitative easing, a form of monetary policy in which the
Federal Reserve purchases securities issued by the U.S. Treasury and other agencies.
Quantitative easing differs from traditional open market operations because the scale is
much larger, longer-term Treasuries and other types of securities are used, and the focus
is on adjusting the quantity of reserves, instead of the price of reserves (Dolan 2011).
Quantitative easing has taken a large amount of long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed
securities off the market, which may be causing a collateral shortage in the repurchase
agreement market, because repurchase agreements typically use these very securities. The
aim of quantitative easing is to increase bank reserves, which the Federal Reserve hopes
will lead to an increase in lending through an increase in the money supply (The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2011). Even though quantitative easing has resulted in a huge
expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, it has not been effective in stimulating
economic recovery. Each subsequent round of quantitative easing has been less effective
than the last in stimulating credit creation and economic growth, signifying a diminishing
effect of the policy (Rosenberg 2013).
Shadow banks include all entities outside of the regulated banking system that
perform credit intermediation; the four aspects of credit intermediation include credit risk
transfer, leverage, liquidity transformation, and maturity transformation (Kodres 2013).
Shadow banking includes vehicles such as money market funds, hedge funds, structured
investment vehicles, repurchase agreements, and other non-bank financial instruments
1

(Adrian, Ashcraft and Cetorelli 2013). These instruments are often sponsored by or
affiliated with banks, investment banks in particular (Kodres 2013). Many shadow banks
rely on funding provided by repurchase agreements or asset-backed commercial paper, as
opposed to traditional banks which rely on deposits for funding (Adrian and Ashcraft
2012).
Shadow banks behave like banks in that they generate credit by issuing liabilities,
but they differ from traditional banks in that they are widely unregulated (Adrian and
Ashcraft 2012). They also do not have access to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) or the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window, making them more
fragile than traditional banks (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012). 1 Certain shadow banking
instruments, such as repurchase agreements, use U.S. Treasuries, mortgage-backed
securities, and agency bonds as collateral, but quantitative easing has taken many of these
securities off the market (McCormick and Kruger 2012). Therefore, some argue that the
shadow banking system is starved of collateral, which has caused shadow bank lending to
decrease (Kessler 2013). In 2008, the shadow bank system contracted significantly, and
certain facets of shadow banking have experienced little to no growth since that decline
(Kocjan, Ogilvie, Schneider, and Srinivas 2012). Although the purpose of quantitative
easing is to increase lending and credit intermediation, if shadow banking has suffered
due to quantitative easing, then the program may have counterproductive effects. My goal
is to determine and quantify the effect of quantitative easing on shadow banking.

1

The FDIC is a government entity that insures bank deposits against bank failures. The
FDIC aims to maintain confidence and stability within the banking system. The Federal
Reserve Discount Window is where banks can borrow from the Federal Reserve.
2

In order to answer the question of whether quantitative easing has led to a
decrease in shadow bank credit intermediation, I will focus on repurchase agreements. A
repurchase agreement, also known as a repo, is a money market instrument used to raise
capital (BlackRock 2014). It is essentially a collateralized loan. Through a repurchase
agreement, the owner of a security sells it to an investor, receiving cash in return, with
the agreement to buy the security back at a predetermined price at a later, predetermined
date (BlackRock 2014). Repos serve as relatively safe short-term loans for investors and
cheap financing for security holders (Carpenter 2014). Uses of repurchase agreements
include meeting short-term funding requirements, obtaining cheaper credit than possible
through other speculative instruments, financing long positions, and more (Carpenter
2014). Repos allow the seller to receive secured funding and allow the buyer to receive
liquidity on a short-term basis. Typically, repurchase agreements are performed on an
overnight basis, with the security bought back the next day (Financial Stability Board
2012). I have chosen to focus on repurchase agreements because they inherently require
the use of collateral and would presumably be directly affected by any collateral
availability fluctuations caused by quantitative easing. Focusing on repurchase
agreements, rather than shadow banking as a whole, will make it easier to understand if
quantitative easing has caused a collateral shortage. Lastly, repurchase agreements often
involve the use of government and agency securities, which are the types of securities
that the Federal Reserve has been buying.
I attempt to determine whether quantitative easing has caused a counterproductive
consequence of decreased credit intermediation, which, if found to be true, may hold
monetary policy implications. I aim to increase understanding of the Federal Reserve’s
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ability to control or influence the shadow banking system. Such an increase in
understanding might be helpful to policymakers.

4

Literature Review
Quantitative Easing
The financial crisis of 2008 and the following recession called for unconventional
monetary policy (Williams 2013). With interest rates at the zero bound, the Federal
Reserve could not stimulate demand by lowering interest rates any further (Dolan 2011).
Therefore, the U.S. central bank responded to the financial crisis through unconventional
measures. Open market operations, the buying and selling of bonds, have been a major
form of monetary policy for decades. The financial crisis, however, spurred an innovative
variety of open market operation. The Federal Reserve started using quantitative easing, a
specific open market operation wherein the Federal Reserve buys long-term Treasury and
other securities. Quantitative easing differs from traditional open market operations
because it operates on a much larger scale, involves the purchase of longer-term
securities, and focuses on changing the quantity (not the price) of reserves (Dolan 2011).
When the Federal Reserve buys a security, money is given to the bond dealer that
previously owned the security, which increases the money supply if the bond dealer
deposits and the bank lends out the funds. Because the bond dealers are typically part of
large banks such as Goldman Sachs, the Federal Reserve hopes that the bank, which
employs the bond dealer, will lend a portion of its increased reserves, thereby expanding
the money supply and, hopefully, stimulating economic activity.
Quantitative easing has been pursued on a large scale; the Federal Reserve
“doubled its balance sheet in the three months after the climax of the crisis in September
2008” (Hoermann and Schabert 2011). Before the recession, the Federal Reserve held
5

about $700 billion of Treasuries and partook in open market operations on the scale of
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per week (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Today the Fed holds over two trillion dollars of U.S. Treasuries and engages in buying
tens of billions of U.S. long-term Treasury securities monthly, Federal Reserve holdings
from April 2005 to March 2013 are seen on Figure 1 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
The first round of quantitative easing (QE1) started in November 2008 and lasted for 17
months. It focused primarily on mortgage-backed security purchases, with the Federal
Reserve buying $100 billion of securities a month (Harrison 2011). When QE1 ended in
2010, the Federal Reserve was holding $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed securities, $300
billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of agency debt (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis). As the values of mortgage-backed securities crashed, the Fed took many
mortgage-backed securities onto its balance sheet to prevent further meltdown and to
support the functioning of credit markets (Harrison 2011). The second round, quantitative
easing two (QE2), started in November 2010 and continued until June 2011 (Harrison
2011). During QE2, the Federal Reserve bought $85 billion of U.S. Treasury securities a
month (Harrison 2011). Quantitative easing 3 (QE3), started in September 2012 and is
still continuing, but is slowly being phased out. Starting in December 2013, the Federal
Reserve decided to begin tapering the program by reducing the quantity of securities
bought by $10 billion each month (Shellock 2013). From September 2012 through
December 2013, the Federal Reserve was buying $85 billion of bonds a month. The
monthly purchase consisted of $45 billion of U.S. Treasury securities and $40 billion of
mortgage-backed securities (Kurtz 2013). Currently, the Federal Reserve is phasing out

6

of QE3 by decreasing the amount of securities bought by $10 billion a month (Financial
Times 2013).
Figure 1: Federal Reserve Treasury and MBS Holdings (Millions of Dollars)

Quantitative easing has only been undertaken in troubling economic times when
traditional monetary policy would not be effective, given that interest rates are at the zero
lower bound (Martin and Milas 2012). When quantitative easing was first introduced
after the 2008 financial crisis, the goal was to stabilize a struggling banking system
(Putnam 2013). Quantitative easing is a “very effective tool for central banks to use when
combating a failing banking system facing systematic solvency and liquidity challenges”
(Putnam 2013). Quantitative easing has continued beyond its initial aim during QE1 to
provide liquidity in private markets through purchases of mortgage-backed securities, and
has become the Federal Reserve’s main policy to stimulate economic growth. However,
7

some believe that once growth is positive and the banking system is liquid and solvent,
quantitative easing may have little effect (Bowman, Cai, Davies, and Kamin 2011).
Quantitative easing has extended far beyond the initial banking challenges that existed at
the beginning of the recession, and its usefulness has come into question.
There are varying hypotheses about why the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing
program has not been effective. First, quantitative easing’s effectiveness is dependent on
banks lending their increased reserves to the public and the public re-depositing those
loans. However, banks have instead been holding large quantities of excess reserves
without lending, which halts the multiple expansion of deposits (Auerbach 2013).
Furthermore, companies have been hoarding cheap money and not spending it in
expansionary ways. Also, it is possible that we are in a liquidity trap with low interest
rates and reluctance to spend due to pessimistic expectations, which would make
monetary policy efforts aimed at increasing lending and consumption ineffective (Free
Exchange 2013). Another explanation is that by continuing quantitative easing, the
Federal Reserve is signifying that it has a pessimistic outlook for the economy. This, in
turn, may encourage caution and discourage people from increasing their lending and
spending. Recently, forward guidance by the Federal Reserve has had significant market
impact, evidenced by markets pricing in Federal Reserve announcements far before
policies are implemented (Femia, Friedman, and Sack 2013). Lastly, the purchase of
bonds may have decreased collateral availability, and thus, may have decreased lending
in the shadow bank system, diminishing the effect of increased loans from banks (Kessler
2013).

8

As evidenced by the slow recovery, even extremely low interest rates and massive
liquidity injections are struggling to stimulate the economy. This suggests that
quantitative easing may not be extremely effective at encouraging economic recovery, or
that quantitative easing may have other counterproductive consequences. I will focus on
the possibility of collateral shortages triggered by quantitative easing, which may
decrease collateral-based credit intermediation through shadow banking.

Shadow Banking
Shadow banking is credit intermediation that occurs outside of traditional banks.
Shadow bank transactions occur through vehicles such as money market funds,
repurchase agreements, collateralized debt obligations, and more. Shadow bank
institutions are a network of non-depository financial institutions (Adrian and Ashcraft
2012). They include both investment banks and non-bank financial institutions, such as
hedge funds and monoline insurance companies (Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky, and Pozsar
2012). It is not the institution that defines a transaction as a shadow banking transaction,
but rather the type of transaction in general. For example, when the Federal Reserve does
a repurchase agreement with Goldman Sachs, that transaction is considered part of the
shadow banking system because a repurchase agreement is a shadow bank instrument.
Shadow banks perform maturity, liquidity, and credit transformation (Kodres 2013).
Instead of using deposits, as do traditional banks, shadow banks “typically fund
themselves with securities lending transactions, i.e., use (and re-use) of the collateral they
post with banks” (Grung Moe 2012). Shadow banks behave like banks in that they

9

generate credit by issuing liabilities, but they differ from traditional banks in that they are
widely unregulated and lack access to FDIC and the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.
Shadow banking grew substantially in the years leading up to the financial crisis,
hitting its peak in 2008 at about $20 trillion (Kocjan, Ogilvie, Schneider, and Srinivas
2012). 2 It peaked prior to the financial crisis partly because banks were able to increase
profits by securitizing loans to be sold to mutual funds, hedge funds, and other
institutions (Petroff 2010). By working with investment banks to securitize bank assets,
banks could boost profits, investors could earn higher returns, and consumers could
access cheap credit (Petroff 2010). When things turned sour in 2008, the shadow banking
sector collapsed, as dollar volumes of shadow bank transactions plummeted and asset
prices dropped substantially. During the following recession, the shadow banking system
has been strained and some portions of the system have collapsed (Kocjan, Ogilvie,
Schneider, and Srinivas 2012). Some argue that one explanation for the decrease in
shadow bank lending is that the shadow banking system is facing a collateral shortage
(Kessler 2013). The Federal Reserve’s asset purchases through quantitative easing may
be leaving the shadow banking system without high-quality collateral. In order to test this
hypothesis, I will focus on a specific instrument within shadow banking, the repurchase
agreement.

2

This $20 trillion value is as according to the Deloitte Shadow Banking Index. However,
there is contention over measuring the shadow banking sector, which rises from varying
definitions about what is included within shadow banking.
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Repurchase Agreements
A repurchase agreement, or repo, is an instrument within the shadow banking
system that is inherently tied to collateral, and thus useful in understanding the impact of
quantitative easing on shadow banking (Carpenter 2014). A repurchase agreement is the
sale of a security with an agreement to buy the security back at a later date; it is
essentially a collateralized loan (Fleming and Garbade 2003). The repurchase price is
greater than the original sale price and that difference is equivalent to interest. This
effectively makes the person selling the security at the start of the transaction a borrower
or dealer, while the person initially buying the security is effectively a lender or
counterparty (see Figure 2). In the repo market “banks and other big financial investors
pawn their assets in exchange for trillions of dollars’ worth of short term loans every day”
(Alloway and Rodrigues 2013). The repo market is a huge component of our financial
system and funds trillions of dollars of transactions daily (Alloway 2013). Repurchase
agreements have such a large role in our economy in part due to their ability for
rehypothecation, meaning that the repo lender can perform another repo with the security
it holds (Kessler 2013). 3 Rehypothecation increases collateral velocity and reduces
transaction costs because collateral can be used for more than one transaction at once
(Kessler 2013). This means that repos allow for a rapid credit expansion. However, this
comes with a similar risk as in traditional banking in that the collateral may not be readily
available in the event of a default. If the ability to sell an asset quickly is the essence of

3

Hypothecation is a financial term that describes the posting of collateral for a loan.
Rehypothecation refers to the holder of the collateral asset (the lender) turning around
and using that asset on a second loan in which she is the borrower, not the lender. Thus,
because the asset gets used as collateral on two loans, it is said to be rehypothecated, that
is, hypothecated again.
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liquidity, then the rehypothecation of assets implies that there will be many more loans
for which only a limited amount of liquefiable collateral is available in case anything
goes wrong, a liquidity crunch for example. While an asset can be rehypothecated many
times and thus can support the creation of many loans, the asset can only be sold once
and thus can only provide liquidity to pay off one of the many loans.
Figure 2: Repurchase Agreement Diagram

Date
Settlement

Dealer

(borrower)
Original holder of
securities,
borrows money
with security as
collateral

Counterparty
Security

Money

(lender)

Lends money,
holds security as
collateral during
the loan

End of term
Money (initial + interest)

Security

The repo market often is regarded as safe because of its use of collateral. The repo
market, however, is extremely volatile in times of market anxiety. In 2008, a collateral
crunch was a major factor in the financial crisis. Banks were using toxic assets as
collateral in repo transactions, and their use “to secure repo funding very suddenly
became unacceptable to other banks, causing financial meltdown” (Alloway 2011). Toxic
collateral refers to collateral that is overpriced; when the toxic collateral is priced
correctly there is a sudden drop in available collateral. Once banks stopped accepting this
overpriced collateral, the market faced a shortage of repo-worthy collateral.
12

Changes in collateral availability can cause large-scale shifts in the repurchase
agreement market, as evidenced by repo market’s 2011 shock due to the debt ceiling
crisis (Garcia 2013). The possibility of default led many to worry about the future of the
repo market, because it is extremely reliant on U.S. Treasury securities. Since the
financial crisis, the repo market has contracted significantly, and has not experienced
much growth since (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). While many other shadow
bank instruments have regained volume and have grown substantially after the crisis,
dollar volumes of repurchase agreement transactions have stayed at similar levels since
2008 (see Figure 3). Possible explanations for this contraction include regulatory changes
such as Basel III and/or a lack of high quality collateral (Kessler 2013).
Figure 3: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions of Dollars)

13

Collateral Crunch
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, demand for collateral based transactions
increased. This occurred due to more stringent collateral requirements, including Basel
III, which forced banks to maintain large amounts of high-quality liquid assets (Fender
and Lewrick 2013). While financial institutions have increased their demand for highquality securities, they are unable to trade the newly acquired securities, effectively
taking the securities used to satisfy Basel III requirements off the market (Coy 2013).
Furthermore, Treasuries have become harder to find because the Federal Reserve
has bought huge amounts of Treasury securities through quantitative easing (Kessler
2013). These large-scale purchases have led some to worry about the amount of Treasury
and agency securities actually available for purchase. In December 2012, “investors bid
for more than four times the amount of two-year notes the Treasury auctioned”
(McCormick and Kruger 2012). At the same time, the Federal Reserve was absorbing
approximately “90 percent of net new dollar-denominated fixed-income assets” through
their monthly QE purchases of $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion
of U.S. Treasuries (McCormick and Kruger 2012).
The actual supply of Treasury securities that is available for shadow bank credit
intermediation seems to be shrinking as demand is increasing (see Figure 4). The supply
of high-quality collateral is independent of demand changes; the supply of U.S.
government bonds is driven by the financing needs of the government, not by the amount
of Treasury securities demanded in the market. Furthermore, strict capital requirements
and Federal Reserve purchases have contracted tradable supply further (Coy 2013). The

14

securities that allow for shadow bank credit intermediation are becoming harder and
harder to find.
Figure 4: Supply and Demand for High Quality Collateral
Notes:
•

•

•

D and S
represent
initial supply
and demand
D’ represents
increased
demand for
high quality
collateral due
to more
stringent
collateral
requirements
S’ represents
decreased
supply due to
QE
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Data
To determine the effect of Federal Reserve holdings, specifically changes due to
quantitative easing, on repurchase agreement flows, I construct a time-series data set
using weekly data from April 2005 to March 2013. I focus on repurchase agreements
because they are an instrument within shadow banking that implicitly requires the use of
collateral, and would be most affected by changes in collateral availability.
The following subsections detail each of the data series that I construct and which
will be used below in regressions to determine the effect of quantitative easing on the
repo market. The first subsection discusses the dependent variable. The next discusses the
various independent variables.

Dependent Variable
Change in Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions of Dollars)
In the regressions below, the left-hand side variable is the weekly change in
repurchase agreements by primary dealers. This is calculated as a difference; repurchase
agreements at time 0 minus repurchase agreements at time t-1. It is the first difference of
weekly repurchase agreements. I used the flow of primary dealer repurchase agreements
because level values are non-stationary. 4 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York

4

Stationarity is commonly assumed in time series regressions. Stationarity means that the
mean, variance, and autocorrelation do not change over time. Stationarity makes it easier
to predict values using regressions.
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publishes the data needed to calculate these first differences weekly. This data series is
the most comprehensive repurchase agreement series available.
Primary dealers serve as trading counterparties to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, and participate as counterparties in New York Federal Reserve trades. The
minimum capital threshold to become a primary dealer is $150 million (Federal Reserve
Bank of New York 2010). Primary dealers report weekly to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York on their trading activities, financing positions, and cash positions. The data
represents the aggregate amount of overnight/continuing and term agreement repurchase
agreements by primary dealers. While other smaller institutions not classified as primary
dealers can perform repos, the “primary dealer data include all repos that use open market
operations (OMO)-eligible and corporate collateral…Primary dealers do not comprise the
entire universe of securities dealers active in the repo market, but [Copeland, Davis,
LeSueur and Margin argue] that the vast majority of repo activity is conducted by these
dealers” (Copeland, Davis, LeSueur, and Martin 2012). Thus, primary dealer repos
provide a strong estimate for movements across the total repurchase agreement. Primary
dealers are the most likely dealers to be affected by Federal Reserve policy because the
Federal Reserve trades directly with them.

Independent Variables
Change in Short-Term Treasury Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars)
Change in short-term Treasury securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in
U.S. Treasury securities maturing within one year held by the Federal Reserve. The unit
is millions of dollars. The calculation for this series is: short-term Treasuries held by the
17

Fed at time 0 minus short-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first
difference of short-term securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published
weekly on the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. I used the flow of short-term
Treasuries because level values are non-stationary. This sums the FRED data series “U.S.
Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve: Maturing” within 15 days, 16-90 days,
and 91 days to 1 year (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Change in Long-Term Treasury Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars)
Change in long-term Treasury securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in
U.S. Treasury securities maturing in over one year held by the Federal Reserve. The unit
is millions of dollars. This is calculated as: long-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time 0
minus long-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first difference of longterm securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published weekly on the St.
Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. I use the flow of long-term Treasuries because
level values are non-stationary. This sums FRED data series “U.S. Treasury securities
held by the Federal Reserve: Maturing in” 1-5 years, 5-10 years, and over 10 years
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Change in Mortgage-Backed Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars)
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in the
dollar value mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve, in millions of
dollars. The calculation is: mortgaged-backed securities held by the Fed at time 0 minus
mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first difference of
mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published weekly on
18

the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database under the title “Mortgage-backed securities
held by the Federal Reserve: All Maturities.” I use the flow of mortgage-backed
securities held by the fed, because the levels are non-stationary.
Change in Federal Debt Held by the Public (Millions of Dollars)
This is the weekly change in U.S. federal debt held by the public. Debt held by
the public consists of all federal debt held by individuals, corporations, state governments,
local governments, foreign governments, and other entities (TreasuryDirect). It does not
include the Federal Financing Bank or the Federal Reserve. It includes, but is not limited
to, securities such as Treasury bills, Treasury notes, Treasury bonds, U.S. savings bonds,
state and local government securities, and Treasury inflation-protected securities. The
United States Treasury publishes level values daily. I use the weekly flow of federal debt
held by the public, because the levels are non-stationary.
Change in Federal Debt Held by the Government (Millions of Dollars)
This is the weekly change in intragovernmental holdings of U.S. Federal Debt.
Intragovernmental holdings consist of Government Account Series securities held by
government trust funds, special funds, and revolving funds. Intragovernmental holdings
are incurred when the government borrows from federal trust funds to fund government
operations. These holdings consist primarily of the Social Security Trust Fund, the
Medicare Trust Fund, and Federal Financing Bank securities (Treasury Direct). The

19

United States Treasury publishes level values daily. I use the weekly flow of
intragovernmental holdings, because the levels are non-stationary. 5
Treasury Fails/Treasury Transactions (Percentage Points)
This series consists of the dollar value of primary dealer “fails to deliver” on U.S.
government securities divided by the dollar value of primary dealer outright and
financing transactions of U.S. government securities (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York). The fails data includes fails for both outright and financing transactions (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York). U.S. government fails occur when transactions using
Treasury securities fail to settle on the agreed upon date (Fleming and Garbade 2005).
Failures to deliver occur when a primary dealer does not deliver a security for a
transaction on the agreed upon date.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York also publishes failure to receive data.
Because the failure to deliver and failure receive data series have a correlation coefficient
of 0.99, I choose to use only failures to deliver. Fails are reported weekly on a cumulative
basis. Fails continue to be counted until the transaction is settled (Fleming and Garbade
2005). For example, if a dealer fails to deliver $10 million of Treasury securities on a
Monday, but delivers the securities that Tuesday, then the dealer reports $10 million in
fails to deliver. If that $10 million delivery does not occur until Friday, four days after the
scheduled date, then the dealer reports $40 million in fails to deliver.

5

Note that neither the change in federal debt held by the public nor the change in federal
debt held by the government includes debt held by the Federal Reserve. Change in
federal debt held by the Federal Reserve is reflected in change in short-term and longterm Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve.
20

Fails are believed to affect market liquidity, particularly when they occur at high
levels (Fleming and Garbade 2005). Fails and transaction data series are published
weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The quotient Treasury Fails/Treasury
Transactions represents the proportion of primary dealer Treasury securities failures to
deliver divided by primary dealer outright and financing transactions using Treasury
securities. The Treasury transactions value includes T-bills, Treasury coupons, and
Treasury inflation-indexed securities for both outright and financing transactions. It does
not include repurchase agreements, because the primary dealer survey does not specify
the type of security used in repurchase agreements. Therefore, the Treasury security
transactions value likely leaves out some transactions that use Treasury securities, repos
in particular.
Mortgage-Backed Security Fails/Mortgage-Backed Security Transactions (Percentage
Points)
Mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions is the
dollar value of primary dealer fails to deliver mortgage-backed securities divided by the
dollar value of primary dealer outright and financing transactions of mortgage-backed
securities. Fails data includes fails for both outright and financing transactions.
Mortgage-backed fails occur when transactions using mortgage-backed securities fail to
settle on the agreed upon date. Failures to deliver occur when a primary dealer does not
deliver a security for a transaction on the agreed upon date. Fails and transaction data
series are published weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mortgage-backed
security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions represents the proportion of
mortgage-backed securities failures to deliver by primary dealers divided by the outright
21

and financing transactions using mortgage-backed securities by primary dealers. The
denominator likely leaves out some transactions because I only use primary dealer data
that specifies when mortgage-backed securities are being used.

Dummy Variables
In the regressions below, I also used a number of binary (zero or one) dummy variables:
2005- Dummy variable for the year 2005
2006-Dummy variable for the year 2006
2007-Dummy variable for the year 2007
2008-Dummy variable for the year 2008
2009-Dummy variable for the year 2009
2010-Dummy variable for the year 2010
2011-Dummy variable for the year 2011
2012-Dummy variable for the year 2012
Basel III- Dummy variable for the after the Basel III capital, liquidity, and leverage
requirements changes were agreed upon on 12/16/2010. Basel III raises banks’ required
amounts of capital, introduces a minimum leverage ratio, and introduces required
liquidity ratios
Crisis- Dummy variable for after Lehman Brothers collapse on 9/15/2008
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QE1- Dummy variable for the first round of quantitative easing from 11/25/20083/31/2010
QE2-Dummy variable for the second round of quantitative easing from 3/3/20106/30/2011
QE3-Dummy variable for the third round of quantitative easing from 9/13/2012-the end
of the dataset (3/27/2013)
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the aforementioned variables.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Repo
Fed ST
Treasuries
Fed LT
Treasuries
Fed MBS

Debt Held by
Public
Debt Held by
Government
Treasury
Tightness
MBS
Tightness

Mean
Repo flow, millions of dollars
Flow of Fed holdings of
short-term Treasuries,
millions of dollars
Flow of Fed holdings of longterm Treasuries, millions of
dollars
Flow of Fed holdings of
mortgage-backed securities,
millions of dollars
Flow of debt held by the
public, millions of dollars
Flow of debt held by the
government, millions of
dollars
Treasury fails/Treasury
transactions, percentage
points
MBS fails/MBS transactions,
percentage points

Min

-651.5
-909.17

Standard
Deviation
107,947.9
4,493.03

Max

-564,857
-38,266

256,845
12,335

3,504.62

7,760.02

-19,710

39,682

2,580.56

15,768.47

-17,390

167,531

14,988.61

36,911.35

-73,987.3

236,328

4,023.32

21,125.66

-63,068.6

105,527.8

2.27

6.11

0.15

57.23

13.34

16.16

0.15

84.14
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Methods
I test the effect of quantitative easing on repurchase agreements using ordinary
least squares regressions.
I apply the Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests on all continuous variables to ensure their
stationarity. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is that the variable being tested
contains a unit root; the alternative hypothesis is that the variable is stationary. The null
hypothesis was rejected for all variables, ensuring that all continuous variables are
stationary. Next, I determine the optimal lag length by finding the autoregressive process
that minimizes the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). I use heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors for all regressions.
With those preliminaries completed, I estimate the following regression model,
which explores the relationship between the dependent variable, weekly change in
primary dealer repurchase agreements, and the independent variables: change in shortterm Treasury securities held by the Fed, change in long-term Treasury securities held by
the Fed, change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed, change in federal debt
held by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, Treasury
fails/Treasury transactions, mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security
transactions, and dummy variables for years 2005-2010, Basel III, the financial crisis, and
rounds one to three of quantitative easing.
Expressed algebraically, the model looks like:
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I then run a similar regression, using BIC determined optimal lags.

Next, I run specific regressions during each period of quantitative easing to see if the
effect on repurchase agreement flows varies across the three rounds. I also run these
regressions with a variety of lags.
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These regressions attempt to isolate the effects of Federal Reserve purchases on
the flows of repurchase agreements. Two limitations are that these regressions assume
that changes in primary dealer repurchase agreements are indicative of repo flows across
the entire repo market and there may be omitted variable bias.
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Results
A. Regressions for Entire Time Period
The first set of regressions regress primary dealer repurchase agreement weekly
changes on the dependent variables from April 6th, 2005 to March 27th, 2013. The units of
the dependent variable are millions of dollars. This timeframe contains 415 weekly
observations. The first regression uses no lags. The second regression uses the lags
determined by prior BIC tests. The regression results are presented in columns of (1) and
(2), respectively of Table 2.
Regression 1
In Regression 1, with no lags, the following variables were statistically significant:
change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public,
change in federal debt held by the government, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and
Basel III.
The results indicate that a 1 million dollar increase in change of short-term
Treasuries held by the Fed is associated with a 2.64 million dollar increase in change in
primary dealer repurchase agreements, on average. The results also indicate that a 1
million dollar increase in federal debt held by the public leads to a -0.63 million dollar
decrease in weekly repo flows. Further, a 1 million dollar increase in federal debt held by
the government is associated with a -2.09 million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows.
The negative coefficient on Basel III indicates that weekly repurchase agreement flows
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dropped significantly after Basel III was passed. This model explains 24.91% of the
variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements.
Regression 2
In Regression 2, using BIC optimal lags, the following variables were statistically
significant: one to three week lags of weekly repurchase agreement flows, a two-week lag
of mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve, change in federal debt held
by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, a three week lag of change
in federal debt by the government, Treasury fails/Treasury transactions (Treasury market
tightness), a one-week lag of Treasury market tightness, a two-week lag of MBS
fails/MBS transactions (mortgage-backed security market tightness), 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, Basel III, and QE3.
The negative coefficients on all three lags of weekly repurchase agreement
changes indicate that a one million dollar increase in repo flows is associated with a
decrease of 0.22 million dollars one week later, a decrease of 0.12 million dollars two
weeks later, and a decrease of 0.11 million dollars three weeks later, on average. A one
million dollar increase in change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal
Reserve is associated with a 1.23 million decrease in weekly change in primary dealer
repurchase agreements. A one million dollar increase in federal debt held by the public
leads to a 0.33 million dollar decrease in repurchase agreement flows, on average. A one
million increase in federal debt held by the government is associated with to a 2.14
million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows, while a three-week lagged million dollar
increase in federal debt held by the government is associated with a 0.31 million dollar
increase in weekly repurchase agreement flows. A one percentage point increase in
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Treasury fails/Treasury transactions, which represents Treasury market tightness, is
associated with a 4,513.48 million dollar decrease, and a one-week lag of Treasury
market tightness is associated with a 3,244.95 million dollar decrease in repo flows, on
average. A one percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is
associated with a 1,722.33 million dollar decrease in change in primary dealer repurchase
agreements, on average. Furthermore, my regression results indicate that Basel III led to a
decrease in weekly flows in repurchase agreements. Lastly, the third round of quantitative
easing is associated with an increase in weekly repo flows. This model explains 39.41%
of the variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements.
Table 2: Repurchase Agreement Flows (2005-2013)
Section A: Regressions 1 and 2
(1)
Constant

218104.8
(62255.50)

L1.Repo flow
L2.Repo flow
L3.Repo flow
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed

2.64*
(1.58)
Chang in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed
0.13
(0.87)
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 0.5
(0.33)
L1.Fed MBS flow
L2.Fed MBS flow
Change in federal debt held by the public

-0.63**
(0.19)

L1.Federal debt public flow
Change in federal debt held by the government

-2.09**
(0.45)

(2)
814666.70
(192948.20)
-0.22**
(0.05)
-0.12**
(0.05)
-0.11**
(0.04)
2.26
(1.53)
0.34
(0.73)
-0.16
(0.28)
-0.20
(0.27)
-1.23**
(0.36)
-0.33*
(0.19)
0.25
(0.19)
-2.14**
(0.43)
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L1.Federal debt government flow
L2.Federal debt government flow
L3. Federal debt government flow
Treasury Fails/Transactions

727.74
(1977.54)

L1.Treasury tightness
MBS Fails/Transactions

-137.22
(488.43)

L1.MBS tightness
L2.MBS tightness
L3.MBS tightness
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Basel III
Crisis
QE1
QE2
QE3

-190443.6**
(67749.81)
-208001.1**
(65616.20)
-187354.6**
(36675.36)
-183161.6**
(63375.36)
-96538.09**
(49393.15)
-86403.9**
(42776.19)
9861.22
(33873.81)
14218.39
(25763.01)
-117121.5**
(24648.53)
-83434.21
(51316.69)
-27338.8
(33449.82)
-30679.27
(23788.17)
-19042
(19370.80)

-0.04
(0.18)
0.30
(0.19)
0.31*
(0.17)
-4,513.48**
(2169.28)
-3,244.95**
(1438.86)
-59.05
(493.06)
767.05
(555.35)
-1,722.33**
(604.21)
693.55
(603.05)
-498,440.50**
(113805.80)
-514,131.70**
(111340.40)
-475,037.60**
(105590.10)
-446,481.70**
(98789.69)
-257,742.40**
(63422.54)
-198,091.10**
(51359.34)
-66,497.67
(40397.61)
1796.86
(25035.13)
-129,248.10**
(27409.43)
583.32
(59298.14)
-49,916.70
(32815.94)
-21,900.48
(23917.14)
39,755.51*
(22464.69)
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n
R2
F

415
0.2491
5.5

412
0.3941
7.43

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, **p<0.05

B. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 1 (QE 1)
The first round of quantitative easing (QE1) lasted from November 25, 2008 to
March 31, 2010. During QE1, the Federal Reserve bought $1.25 trillion of mortgagebacked securities, $300 billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of agency securities.
This section reports on the same two regression models described above, but
estimated only on data from the QE1 period. The units of the dependent variable are
millions of dollars. The QE1 timeframe contains 70 weekly observations. The first
regression uses no lags. The second regression incudes the same variables as Regression
1, with the addition of one- and two-week lags of the change in mortgage-backed
securities held by the Federal Reserve, as indicated using BICs.
Regression 1
Table 3 reveals that in a regression using all continuous variables and dummy
variables for the years 2009 and 2010, the following independent variables are
statistically significant: change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in longterm Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, and MBS
fails/MBS transactions (mortgage-backed security market tightness), 2009, and 2010. The
estimated slope coefficients demonstrate that a 1 million dollar increase in the change in
short-term Treasuries held by the Fed leads to a 14.72 million dollar decrease of the
change in primary dealer repurchase agreements, on average. A one million dollar
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increase in long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve is associated with a 3.99
million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows. A one million dollar increase in federal
debt held by the public leads to a 1.15 unit decrease in weekly repurchase agreements, on
average. A one percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is
associated with a 2,537.49 million dollar decrease in weekly repurchase agreement flows.
This model explains 30.87% of the variation in change in primary dealer repurchase
agreements during QE1.
Regression 2
The second regression incudes all continuous variables, plus the addition of oneand two-week lags of the change in primary dealer repurchase agreements and the change
in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve. The results reported in Table
3 indicate that the following independent variables are statistically significant: one-week
lag of repurchase agreement flow, change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed,
change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed, a two-week lag of change in mortgagebacked securities held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, change in
federal debt held by the government, MBS market tightness, 2009, and 2010. A one
million dollar increase in last week’s repo change is associated with a 0.23 million dollar
decrease in repo flows. A one million dollar increase in short-term Treasuries held by the
Fed is associated with a 12.75 million dollar decrease in repo flows, and a one million
dollar increase in long-term securities held by the Fed is associated with a 3.29 million
dollar decrease in repo flows. An increase in mortgage-backed securities held by the
Federal Reserve leads to a 1.20 million decrease in repurchase agreement change, on
average. Increases in federal debt held by the public and by the government are
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associated with repo flow decreases of 0.99 and 1.48 million respectively. A one
percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is associated with
a 2,131.59 million dollar decrease in weekly repurchase agreement flows. This model
explains 44.86% of the variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements
during QE1.
Table 3: Regressions During QE1
Section B: Regressions 1 and 2
Constant
L1.Repo flow
L2.Repo flow
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed
Change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed
L1.Fed MBS flow
L2.Fed MBS flow
Change in federal debt held by the public
Change in federal debt held by the government
Treasury Fails/Transactions
MBS Fails/Transactions
2009
2010

n

(1)
(2)
-160396.7
-131820.90
(100467.70) (101276.90)
-0.23*
(0.13)
-0.08
(0.12)
-14.72**
-12.75**
(4.38)
(4.56)
-3.99**
-3.29*
(2.02)
(1.66)
0.6
0.18
(0.49)
(0.51)
-0.15
(0.39)
-1.20**
(0.31)
-1.15**
-0.99**
(0.34)
(0.32)
-1.28
-1.48*
(0.92)
(0.86)
8152.65
2,522.42
(7113.57)
(7769.44)
-2537.49** -2,131.59*
(1123.00)
(1085.07)
212444.5** 211,932.80**
(80392.67) (92027.90)
273170.4** 256,832.60**
(87913.67) (96573.59)
70

70
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R2
F

0.3087
2.4

0.4486
2.93

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, **p<0.05

C. Regressions During Quantitative Easing Two (QE2)
The second round of quantitative easing, QE2, lasted from November 3, 2010 to
June 30, 2011. During QE2, the Federal Reserve concentrated on long-term U.S.
Treasury securities. The Fed bought $75 billion of U.S. Treasuries per month. There are
35 weekly observations during QE2. This is important to note because the small sample
size of only 35 weeks raises questions about the validity of the regression results for the
two regressions. The first regression uses no lags. The second regression uses the same
variables as in regression one plus a one-week lag of repurchase agreement flows.
Regression 1
In this regression, I use all continuous variables and dummy variables for 2010
and Basel III. As shown in Table 4, the following independent variables are statistically
significant: change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held
by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, Treasury fails/Treasury
transactions (Treasury market tightness), 2010, and Basel III. The results indicate that
repo flows increase by 8.68 million per every one million increase in short-term
Treasuries held by the Fed. A one million dollar increase in federal debt held by the
public is associated with a 1.05 million dollar decrease in change in repurchase
agreements. A one million dollar increase in change in federal debt held by the
government is associated with a 0.71 million dollar decrease in repo flows. As Treasury
market tightness increases by one percentage point, primary dealer repurchase agreement
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change decreases by 28,432.39 million, on average. This model explains 56.3% of the
variation in change in primary dealer repurchase agreement flows.
Regression 2
Regression 2 uses the same variables as in Regression 1, but also includes a oneweek lag of repo flows. The results do not vary significantly as a similar set of
independent variables are found to be statistically significant: one-week lag of repo flows,
change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public,
change in federal debt held by the government agencies, Treasury fails/Treasury
transactions (Treasury market tightness), 2010, and Basel III. Compared to the first
regression, the coefficient for change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed falls to
8.16, the coefficient for change in federal debt held by the public falls to -1.03, the
coefficient for change in federal debt held by the public falls to -1.31, and the coefficient
for Treasury fails/Treasury transactions falls to -38,054.62. 62.15% of the variation in
change in primary dealer repurchase agreement flows is explained by this model.
Table 4: Regressions During QE2
Section C: Regressions 1 and 2
Intercept

(1)
86122.11
(49744.58)

L1.Repo flow
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed

8.68**
(3.40)
Change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed
1.56
(1.10)
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 1.21
(2.12)
Change in federal debt held by the public
-1.05**
(0.35)
Change in federal debt held by the government
-0.71*
(0.38)

(2)
108975.10
(35725.90)
-0.38**
(0.19)
8.16**
(3.65)
0.98
(1.01)
-1.03
(1.50)
-1.03**
(0.36)
-1.31**
(0.44)

35

Treasury Fails/Treasury Transactions
MBS Fails/MBS Transactions
2010
Basel III
n
R2
F

-28432.39*
(15166.39)
123.89
(823.07)
-100250.6**
(33088.14)
-120,731.00**
(34432.13)
35
0.563
6.87

-38,054.62*
(19425.70)
775.54
(1043.47)
-152,283.60**
(33,484.48)
-151,555.90**
(29024.28)
35
0.6215
13.5

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.10, **p<0.05

D. Regressions During Quantitative Easing Three (QE3)
The third round of quantitative easing, QE3, started on September 13, 2012 and
continued beyond the end of the dataset in March 2013. Currently, as of April 2014, QE3
is in the process of tapering. QE3 was still ongoing at its original, non-tapered rate as of
the last date included in my data set. During QE3, the Federal Reserve bought both
mortgage-backed securities and U.S. long-term Treasuries. The Fed was buying $40
billion of mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion of long-term U.S. Treasuries a
month. My dataset contains 28 weekly observations during QE3. The small sample size
raises questions about the validity of the regression results, especially considering the
large number of variables. My QE3 regression uses no lags because the BICs did not
suggest using any lags.
Regression 1
In Regression 1, I use all continuous variables and a dummy variable for 2012.
None of the independent variables are statistically significant in this regression.
Furthermore, minimizing BICs does not suggest using a lag for any of the continuous
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variables. My model explains 25% of the variation in change in primary dealer
repurchase agreements during QE3. The F-statistic equals 0.84, which is not statistically
significant and suggests a 58.27% probability of receiving an F-statistic as extreme as
mine if the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 0 is true.
Table 5: Regressions During QE3
Section D: Regression 1
Constant
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed
Change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed
Change in federal debt held by the public
Change in federal debt held by the government
Treasury Fails/Transactions
MBS Fails/Transactions
2012
n
R2
F

(1)
-56346.86
(67260.32)
-38.74
(66.93)
1.86
(3.46)
0.58
(0.69)
-0.23
(0.43)
-1.25
(0.74)
21611.38
(34512.32)
413.05
(2595.41)
32622.78
(36469.40)
28
0.25
0.84

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.10, **p<0.05
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Discussion of Results
A. Regressions for Entire Time Period
The first set of regressions that are reported in Table 2 includes regressions across
the entire time period from 2005 to 2013. During this time period, the aggregate amount
of repurchase agreements traded weekly by primary dealers rose until reaching a peak of
$4,567,192 million in 2008. As the recession started in late 2008, the aggregate amount
of repurchase agreements dropped substantially and has continued to stagnate since (see
Figure 5).
Figure 5: Aggregate Amount of Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions
of Dollars)
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The Federal Reserve started the first round of quantitative easing on November 25, 2008.
At the start of QE1, the Federal Reserve held $648,589 million of long-term U.S.
Treasury securities, $96,290 million of short-term U.S. Treasury securities, and $622,864
million of mortgage-backed securities. At the end of my data set, March 27, 2013, the
Federal Reserve held $1,794,146 million of long-term U.S. Treasury securities, $314
million of short-term U.S. Treasury securities, and $1,070,932 of mortgage-backed
securities (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Federal Reserve Holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed
Securities (Millions of Dollars)

Regression 1 uses no lagged variables, while Regression 2 uses optimal lags as
determined by the BIC. I believe the second model with some BIC selected lags is the
most accurate, as changes in repurchase agreements are likely to be dependent on earlier
happenings. I am primarily testing for the effects of Federal Reserve purchases on the
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repurchase agreement market, and the effects of these changes may not occur
immediately.
Regression 2, which uses some lags, found negative correlations between oneweek, two-week, and three-week lags of primary dealer repurchase agreement flows.
These negative correlations suggest the volatile nature of repurchase agreement flows
across this time period. While the general trend across 2008 was a decline in repo flows,
repo flows stagnated and fluctuated both positively and negatively from 2009 onwards.
The non-lagged regression, Regression 1, found that change in short-term
Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve had a positive correlation with the change in
primary dealer repurchase agreements. The Federal Reserve decreased their holdings of
short-term Treasuries, signifying that the change in Federal Reserve holdings of shortterm Treasuries was negative for most of the period. This result suggests that as the
Federal Reserve decreased its holdings of short-term Treasury securities, the quantity of
repurchase agreements by primary dealers also fell. Both the change in Federal Reserve
holdings of short-term Treasuries and the change in primary dealer repurchase
agreements dropped significantly during 2008, which is likely to be the cause of this
positive relationship. Furthermore, in Figure 6, it is clear that the volume of short-term
Treasuries sold by the Fed is much smaller than the volume of long-term Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities bought by the Fed. The regression with some lags failed to
find a significant relationship. Therefore, I believe the non-lagged results may represent a
spurious relationship that occurred from the negative trend in both series.
While change in long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve has no
statistically significant impact on repurchase agreement flows, a two-week lag of change
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in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve is statistically significant. This
negative coefficient suggests that repurchase agreement flows fall two weeks after the
Fed acquires additional mortgage-backed securities. This could be evidence in favor of
my hypothesis that an increase in Federal Reserve purchases causes declines in
repurchase agreement lending.
Change in federal debt held by the public had statistically significant negative
coefficients in both regressions. Federal debt held by the public includes individuals,
corporations, state and local governments, and other entities. The negative correlation
suggests that most of the entities included in this data series do not make their holdings of
Treasury securities available for repurchase agreements. Large investment banks and
other financial institutions, which make up only a portion of this category, are likely to
trade Treasury securities, but the other groups may refrain from doing so. The small
magnitude suggests that a $1 million increase in federal debt held by the public leads to
only a $0.33 million decrease in repurchase agreement flows. This confirms my
hypothesis that some of the Treasury securities under this bucket are traded, while others
are taken off the market. It is the securities taken off the market that lead to the negative
coefficient.
Change in federal debt held by government agencies had statistically significant
negative coefficients in both regressions. These coefficients were -2.09 and -2.14 in the
non-lagged and lagged regressions respectively. Federal debt held by the government
includes securities held by government trust funds, such as the Social Security Trust Fund.
Securities are typically not traded after being included in these funds, which explains the
negative coefficient. An additional one million dollars of debt held by the government

41

leads to a $2.1 million decrease in repurchase agreements. This falls in line with the
rehypothecation of repurchase agreements. Securities can be lent multiple times;
therefore, taking a single repurchase agreement off the market has a multiplied effect.
The negative coefficients suggest that holdings of U.S. Treasuries in government
agencies are not available for further repos.
It appears that primary dealer repurchase agreements fall as federal debt held by
any group increases. This is counterintuitive because it seems that an increase in the
federal debt, and thus U.S. Treasuries, would lead to an increase in repurchase
agreements. The coefficients of federal debt held by the public and federal debt held by
government agencies of -0.33 and -2.09 respectively, suggest that Treasuries held by the
public have a greater likelihood of being traded.
The lagged regression reports large significant coefficients on Treasury
fails/Treasury transactions, which represents Treasury market tightness. This suggests
that as the Treasury market becomes tighter, fewer repurchase agreements happen. This
supports my hypothesis that collateral scarcity has the potential to cause drastic changes
in repurchase agreement market transactions. The coefficients for no lag and a one-week
lag equal -4,513.48 and -3,244.95 respectively.
Similarly, the lagged regression, Regression 2, finds a statistically significant
two-week lag of mortgage-backed security market tightness with a negative correlation.
This suggests that as mortgage-backed securities become scarcer, primary dealer
repurchase agreements fall two weeks later. This indicates that it may take some time for
the full effect of the market tightness to reach the repurchase agreement market. It is
interesting to note that both MBS market tightness and MBS held by the Fed are
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statistically significant with a two-week lag. This is a potential indication that effects in
the repurchase agreement market due to mortgage-backed security changes do not happen
immediately.
Finally, the dummy variable for Basel III is statistically significant for both
regressions; the coefficients are -117,121.5 in Regression 1 and -129,248.10 in
Regression 2. This implies that the collateral requirements introduced by Basel III caused
the volume of repurchase agreements to fall drastically. This suggests that as banks
prepared for more stringent capital rules, securities that could be used in repos were taken
off the repo market, causing change in primary dealer repurchase agreements to fall.
Regression 1 explains 24.91% of the variation in primary dealer repurchase
agreement flows. Regression 2 explains 39.41% of the variation in primary dealer
repurchase agreement flows. These results suggest that under certain circumstances,
increases in Federal Reserve holdings of repo-worthy assets lead do decreases of
repurchase agreement flows.

B. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1)
QE1 lasted from November 25, 2008 to March 31, 2010. During this timeframe,
the Federal Reserve focused on buying mortgage-backed securities, buying $1.25 trillion
of mortgage-backed securities, $300 billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of
agency securities. I perform two regressions using data from QE1: Regression 1 with no
lags and Regression 2 with BIC determined lags. These regression results are located in
Table 3.
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Repo levels fell significantly at the end of 2008. The amount of primary dealer
repurchase agreements fluctuated, but continued to trend downward from the beginning
of 2009 to the end of QE1 in March 2010 (see Figure 7). During this time period, the
Federal Reserve was buying mortgage-backed securities and some long-term Treasury
securities, taking large amounts of these securities off the market. The Federal Reserve
also sold a small amount of short-term Treasury securities, which added to the supply of
assets that could be used in repos. However, the magnitude of long-term Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities bought by the Fed dwarfs the amount of short-term
Treasuries sold by the Fed during QE1. Figure 8 shows Federal Reserve holdings during
the first round of quantitative easing.
Figure 7: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements During QE1 (Millions of Dollars)
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Figure 8: Federal Reserve Holdings During QE1 (Millions of Dollars)

The lagged regression finds a one-week lag of change in primary dealer
repurchase statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.23. This is consistent with my
findings across the entire timeframe and confirms the repurchase agreement market’s
volatility. While the dollar amount of repurchase agreements had a generally decreasing
trend during QE1, weekly repurchase flows varied significantly. Large drops in primary
dealer repurchase agreements were often followed by a few smaller increases before
another significant decrease (see Figure 7).
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed was statistically significant in
both regressions, with coefficients of -14.72 and -12.75 in the non-lagged and lagged
regressions respectively. This suggests that as the Fed sold short-term Treasury securities
the quantity of repurchase agreements increased. While the volume of short-term
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Treasuries sold during QE1 was not particularly large, this suggests that the increase in
short-term Treasuries available for trade in the market is associated with increased
repurchase agreement transactions. This supports my hypothesis that that decreases in
Federal Reserve holdings of securities that could be used for repos results in increases of
repurchase agreements.
Both regressions had statistically significant negative coefficients for change in
long-term Treasuries held by the Fed. The Federal Reserve bought long-term U.S.
Treasuries during QE1. Repurchase agreement flows decreased by 3.6 times the
equivalent increase of long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve. This supports
my hypothesis that increased Federal Reserve purchases caused decreased repurchase
agreement flows.
The lagged regression found that an increase in mortgage-backed securities held
by the Fed leads to a decrease in change in repurchase agreements two weeks later. I am
not sure why the change in mortgage-backed securities has an effect on repurchase
agreements two weeks later, versus Treasury effects occurring the week of. For some
reason, the effect of mortgage-backed securities being taken off the market by the Federal
Reserve is not felt until two weeks after the transaction. However, my initial regressions
over the entire time period find the same two-week lag for mortgage-backed security
changes to be associated with repurchase agreement changes. This could potentially be
due to a delay in the delivery of mortgage-backed securities. The negative coefficients
support my hypothesis that increases in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal
Reserve lead to decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements.
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Change in federal debt held by the public has negative and statistically significant
coefficients in both regressions. This aligns with the findings during the entire dataset
time period. This could be due to the fact that some of the securities held by the public
are taken off the market after purchase. While financial businesses, which are included in
this data series, are likely to continue trading Treasuries, the other entities may instead
take these securities off the market, causing a total decrease in repurchase agreements.
Change in federal debt held by the government is statistically significant in the
lagged regression. This confirms my hypothesis that Treasury securities held by
government agencies go into funds where they are not traded. The magnitude of this
coefficient, -1.48, is greater than for federal debt held by the public, -0.99, which
suggests that government holdings of federal debt have a more contractionary effect on
repurchase agreements than do public holdings of federal debt. This makes intuitive sense
because the entities included in the public, such as companies and individuals, are more
likely to trade Treasury securities than is the Social Security fund, for example.
Mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions attempts to
represent the tightness in the MBS market. This works because fails to deliver are
thought to happen due to inability to secure the collateral necessary for the transaction.
Both regressions find negative and statistically significant coefficients for MBS
fails/MBS transactions. The coefficients for the non-lagged and lagged regressions equal
-2,537.49 and -2,131.59, respectively. This suggests that as the mortgage-backed security
market gets tighter, fewer repurchase agreements happen. Furthermore, in Figure 9 we
see that mortgage-backed security fails increase as Federal Reserve holdings of
mortgage-backed securities increase during QE1. Figure 10 shows the relationship across
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the entire time period. I am able to use the dollar value for mortgage-backed security fails
in this graph because mortgage-backed security fails and mortgage-backed security
tightness have a 0.9867 correlation. Furthermore, MBS fails and Federal Reserve
holdings of mortgage-backed securities have correlation coefficient of 0.75. This supports
my hypothesis that increased Federal Reserve holdings of mortgage-backed securities is
associated with greater MBS market tightness, which leads to fewer repurchase
agreement flows.
Figure 9: MBS Fails and Federal Reserve Holdings of MBS During QE1 (Millions of
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Figure 10: MBS Fails and Federal Reserve Holdings from 2005-2013 (Millions of
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These models explain 31.87% and 44.86% of the variation in primary dealer
repurchase agreement changes during QE1 for the non-lagged and lagged regressions,
respectively. These observations support my hypothesis that Federal Reserve purchases
of securities that can be used in repurchase agreements lead to decreased amounts of
primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that quantitative easing may have had
the counter-productive tendency to decrease lending in the repurchase agreement market.
By extension, it may have also decreased lending in the other parts of the shadow
banking system, and not just in the repo market which is a subset of the overall shadow
banking system.

49

C. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2)
The Federal Reserve engaged in QE2 from November 3, 2010 to June 20, 2011.
This round of quantitative easing focused on buying long-term U.S. Treasury securities.
QE2 lasted for 35 weeks; therefore, the data include 35 weekly observations. This low
sample size raises questions about the validity of the results, which is particularly
important considering that 10 different variables are included in the regression. Given the
small sample size, I believe my results for the entire time period and during quantitative
easing one are more accurate. Still, the results from QE2 have some interesting features.
These regression results are located in Table 4.
During QE2, the weekly volume of repurchase agreements varied significantly
(see Figure 11). The quantity of primary dealer repurchase agreements dropped
significantly twice, but primary dealer repurchase agreements started and ended QE2 at
similar values. During QE2, the Federal Reserve bought long-term Treasuries, sold some
mortgage-backed securities, and bought small quantities of U.S. short-term Treasuries
(see Figure 12).
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Figure 11: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreement Levels during QE2 (Millions of
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Regression 2, which includes a one-week lag of repurchase agreement flows,
found that a one-week lag of repo flows has a statistically significant negative coefficient
of -0.38. This further emphasizes repurchase agreements’ volatile behavior. Even if a
general trend is present, the weekly change of primary dealer repurchase agreements
varies.
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed had statistically significant
positive coefficients of 8.68 in Regression 1 and 8.16 in Regression 2, which includes a
one-week lag of repo flows. This result is surprising and refutes my hypothesis that
increases in holdings by the Fed leads to decreases in repurchase agreements flows. It
does not seem that the Federal Reserve made any attempts to reverse their squeeze on the
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collateral market during QE2. Therefore, the Federal Reserve attempting to reverse any
collateral shortages is not a potential explanation for the positive coefficient.
The positive change in short-term Treasuries coefficient could indicate that
primary dealers had gotten over the scare caused in 2008, and were less concerned about
counterparty risk and more willing to repo during QE2 than during QE1. Also, this could
be a spurious relationship simply due to the low sample size. Third, this may occur
because the flows of Fed holdings of short-term Treasuries remain relatively close to zero
while repurchase agreement flows fluctuate both positively and negatively throughout the
time period. The correlation coefficient between change in short-term Treasuries held by
the Fed and primary dealer repurchase agreement flows equals 0.0977, suggesting
minimal correlation between the two variables. Neither of the other variables for
securities held by the Federal Reserve have statistical significance in this model, which
shows that Federal Reserve holdings did not have a contractionary effect on repurchase
agreements during QE2.
Change in federal debt held by the public has a negative coefficient of -1.05 and 1.03 in the non-lagged regression and regression with lag of repo flows, respectively.
This suggests about a one-to-one relationship between an increase in Treasuries held by
the public and a decrease in repurchase agreement flows. As discussed earlier, this could
be due to the fact that many of the groups included in “the public” do not allow for their
Treasury securities to be used for repurchase agreements, effectively taking them off the
repo market.
Change in federal debt held by the government also has a negative coefficient;
this coefficient equals -1.31 for the regression including a lag of change in primary dealer
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repurchase agreements. This is consistent with my previous findings and confirms that
increases in Treasuries held by government lead to decreases in repurchase agreements.
Treasury fails divided by Treasury transactions, which represents tightness in the
Treasury market, is statistically significant with a negative coefficient. The coefficient
for the Regression 2 equals -38,054.62. This suggests that fewer repurchase agreements
happen when the market for U.S. Treasury securities gets tighter. Fails to deliver can be
caused by a lack of collateral availability. Mortgage-backed security market tightness was
significant during QE1 when the Fed was buying mortgage-backed securities, and
Treasury market tightness was significant during QE2 when the Fed was buying Treasury
securities. This may indicate that repurchase agreements become more susceptible to
changes in MBS or Treasury market tightness when the Federal Reserve is buying that
specific type of security.
A dummy variable for Basel III is statistically significant with a negative
coefficient in both regressions. This suggests that the passage of Basel III, which
increased capital requirements for banks, led to a decrease in repurchase agreement flows.
Given that many of the financial institutions Basel III is targeted at are the same primary
dealers included in the repurchase agreement data, it is not surprising that Basel III has a
large effect. As these banks are forced to keep more capital, thus, they cannot perform
repurchase agreements with those securities.
My model explains 57.3% of the variation in the original regression and 62.15%
of the variation in the model with a one-week lag of repo flows.
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D. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 3 (QE3)
QE3 started in September 13, 2012 and continued through the end of the dataset
in March 2013. This round of quantitative easing involved the Federal Reserve
purchasing both mortgage-backed securities and long-term U.S. Treasuries. The Fed
bought $45 billion of long-term U.S. Treasuries and $40 billion of mortgage-backed
securities each month. My dataset contains 28 observations during quantitative easing
three. This small sample size is problematic and may indicate a lack of validity of my
results. These regression results are located in Table 5.
During the portion of QE3 that I have data for, the amount of primary dealer
repurchase agreements fell, but did so with various fluctuations along the way (see Figure
13). The Federal Reserve increased holdings of long-term U.S. Treasuries and mortgagebacked securities during this time.
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My regression of change in primary dealer repurchase agreements on my
continuous variables and a dummy variable for year 2012 did not produce any
statistically significant coefficients. This suggests that changes in Treasury holdings,
changes in federal debt, and Treasury and mortgage-backed security market tightness did
not have statistically significant relationships with repurchase agreement flows. One
explanation for the lack of relationship between Federal Reserve asset purchases and repo
flows is that the Federal Reserve increased their reverse repurchase agreement
transactions before QE3, which may be an effort to reverse their squeeze on collateral
availability (see Figure 14). By performing reverse repos, the Fed borrows money and
uses securities as collateral, inserting collateral into the market. The primary dealers on
the other side of the transaction can use these securities in other transactions, which
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would help mitigate the effects of a collateral shortage. This may explain the lack of a
relationship between Federal Reserve purchases and repurchase agreement flows during
QE3. Also, the small sample size could contribute to the lack of significant relationships.
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Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of Federal Reserve asset purchases, quantitative
easing in particular, on the repurchase agreement market. Under certain circumstances,
increases in Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to decreased flows of repurchase
agreements. From 2005 to 2013, a two-week lag of increases in mortgage-backed
securities held by the Fed is associated with a decrease in primary dealer repurchase
agreements. This effect is most robust during QE1, during which the Federal Reserve
increased its holdings of mortgage-backed securities and long-term U.S. Treasury
securities. During QE1, I found that increases in Federal Reserve holdings of Treasury
securities and mortgage-backed securities were associated with declines in primary dealer
repurchase agreements.
This demonstrates that Federal Reserve purchases have the ability to affect the
shadow banking system, even though the shadow banking system falls outside of the
Fed’s regulatory remit and beyond the traditional purview of Fed policy. The existence of
the negative relationship between Federal Reserve purchases and primary dealer
repurchase agreements under certain circumstances supports my hypothesis that
quantitative easing led to decreased lending in the repurchase agreement market. The
decrease in repurchase agreements is counterproductive to the goal of quantitative easing,
which is to increase lending.
The results do not find this relationship under all circumstances. During QE2 and
QE3, increases in Federal Reserve security purchases are not associated with decreases in
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repurchase agreement flows. Therefore, assertions of an overwhelming collateral
shortage caused by quantitative easing are not supported. The lack of effect could be due
to the small sample sizes or to the Federal Reserve taking actions to reverse the collateral
crunch, which is evidenced by their increases in reverse repurchase agreements during
QE3. Another possibility is that decreases in repurchase agreements during QE1 occurred
in part due to market pessimism, and not entirely due to a lack of collateral availability.
This study shows that the monetary policy has the potential to affect the shadowbanking system, even if those effects are unintentional. While quantitative easing is
aimed at traditional banking, unintended and counterproductive consequences may occur
in the shadow bank system. The shadow banking system has become a huge part of our
economy, warranting greater consideration by monetary policy makers.
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